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Abstract
Following the 1998-99 NBA lockout, the league instituted a new collective bargaining agree-
ment (CBA) that, among other things, set a cap on individual player salaries for the first
time in a professional sports league. This paper examines how these changes affected com-
petitive balance within the league. I find that, contrary to previous results, the 1999 CBA
had no effect on parity within the NBA. Furthermore, I find evidence that as the NBA has
opened its doors to international players, competition within the league has become more
balanced.
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1 Introduction
In 2010, LeBron James and Chris Bosh joined Dwayne Wade on the Miami Heat to
form what many fans worried would become a super-team. These apprehensions proved
warranted as the team made the National Basketball Association (NBA) finals during each
of the four years that the trio were together. While some fans, particularly those in Miami,
were ecstatic about the formation of this super-team, most fans were unhappy with the
newly created imbalance. In particular, they were angry that these players had decided
to take a pay cut to play, and win, together. However, these fans failed to notice that
the policies instituted by the NBA are as much to blame as the players. When the NBA
instituted a maximum salary for individual players as part of the 1999 Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), the league prevented teams from paying star players their fair market
value. Therefore, players like LeBron James only forgo a few million dollars when they take
a pay cut rather than the tens of millions of dollars that they would have to sacrifice if the
cap did not exist. As long as such measures are in place, it is likely that super-teams like the
Miami Heat will continue to form and completely redefine the competitive landscape within
the NBA.
While there is a great deal of literature that examines the relationship between competi-
tive balance and salary caps at the team level, there is little consideration in the literature of
the effect of maximum individual salaries on competitive balance. Kesenne (2000) creates a
theoretical framework to study this phenomenon while Maxcy and Mondello (2006) uses an
empirical model, which captures the first few years that the individual salary cap is imple-
mented in the NBA. Both studies find that individual player salary caps reduce competitive
balance within a league. I extend this line of study by examining the effects that individual
salary caps have had on competitive balance in the NBA since their introduction following
the 1999 CBA. Unlike previous literature, I find that the changes enacted in the 1999 CBA
do not appear to be a determining factor in competitive balance. While there does appear to
be an improvement in competitive balance around the turn of the century, my results suggest
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that this improvement was not caused by collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, I also
try to capture the effects that the increase in international players has had on competitive
balance in the NBA. My results, which agree with previous studies, suggest that the influx
of foreign players has increased parity with the NBA.
Section 2 discusses the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement and the structure of the
league’s salary cap. Subject 3 reviews the literature on the subject. Section 4 discusses
the data. Section 5 explains the specification of the model. Section 6 interprets the results
and considers policy recommendations. Section 7 details the robustness checks. Section 8
concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Salary Cap
With the exception of Major League Baseball (MLB), every major North American sports
league implements some form of salary cap. A team level salary cap is a limit that the league
sets as a maximum level of spending and is identical for each team. Owners argue that the
team level salary cap limits team payrolls to manageable levels and improves competitive
balance within the league. Unsurprisingly, players tend to be dissatisfied with salary caps as
they reduce overall spending on player salaries without providing any obvious compensation
in return. The details of the salary cap, however, vary across leagues. The National Hockey
League (NHL) and National Football League (NFL) use a hard salary cap, meaning that
teams are unable to go above the threshold set by the league each year. The NBA, on the
other hand, implements a soft salary cap. A soft cap allows teams to spend more than the
threshold under a variety of conditions and, therefore, is less binding than a hard salary cap.
In addition to the salary cap at the team level, both the NBA and NHL have a limit on the
salaries of individual players.
The modern NBA first instituted a team level salary cap in 1984, but the particulars
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of this agreement are updated periodically (Coon, 2005a).1 The salary cap stipulates that
the players are entitled to earn at least a specified percentage of Basketball Related Income
(BRI), which has historically hovered around 50%, while the owners are entitled to the rest.
Table 1 shows how the players’ share of BRI has varied across different CBAs.2 If the teams
do not spend enough to reach this threshold, the league is required to pay the difference to
the players union (Coon, 2012).
Table 1: Players’ Share of Revenue
1984 1995 1999 2005 2011
53.00% 48.04% 48.04% 50.00% 44.74%
While the salary cap is intended to limit spending, there are many loopholes that make
it easy for teams to exceed the cap. For instance, the Larry Bird Exception allows a team
to exceed the cap to sign its own free agents, provided that the players have been with the
team for a sufficient period of time.3 Another example is the Mid-Level exception, which
allows teams to spend up to the average NBA salary on free agents; the amount may be
used on a single free agent or split over multiple players. Similarly, the Bi-Annual exception
permits teams to sign free agents to a small contract every other year. Finally, teams may
also sign rookies or free agents to the minimum salary, even if it takes them over the cap
(Coon, 2012). Because it is so easy for teams to exceed the cap, another important factor in
the NBA’s soft cap is the luxury tax, which is applied to any teams whose spending exceeds
the cap. Historically, teams have had to pay an extra dollar for every dollar that they were
over the cap. That is, if a team exceeded the cap by five million dollars, it would have to
pay that five million dollars as well as an additional five million dollars in tax (Coon, 2005a).
Recent changes to the CBA specifies that teams that pay the luxury tax are charged an
1The CBA has gone through revisions in 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2011.
2The actual payout to players may vary because the player’s share of BRI is based on projected revenue.
The deviations are not significant, but they are also not negligible.
3This period has typically been three years. Because the exact details of the Larry Bird Exception as
well as those of other exceptions tend to be rather complicated, the full specifics will not be discussed here.
More detailed information can be found on Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ.
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additional and increasing fee for every dollar that they spend above the cap (Coon, 2012).
These funds are then redistributed equally to all teams that did not exceed the luxury tax.
In short, there are quite a few ways for teams to go over the salary, but it usually costs a
team to do so.
The 1995 CBA was notable for its introduction of scaled rookie salaries. Essentially, the
league set a specific salary for each draft spot, which was non-negotiable by both the player
and the team involved. This convention was adopted for two reasons. First, players often
disagreed with teams about the salary that they should earn; in fact, many rookies refused
to play until they were granted a contract they felt was justified. Second, conflict arose
between veteran players and rookies because many of the veterans were earning less than
the rookies despite the difference in experience (Coon, 2005b). This measure is particularly
important because the NBA has instituted a lottery for the draft where the worst teams are
the most likely to obtain the highest draft picks. Under this system, they are guaranteed
that the talented young players they draft will sign with them at a reasonable price.
The 1999 CBA saw the implementation of the first cap on individual player salaries
in professional sports. The maximum salary is based upon the number of years that an
individual has played in the NBA. Players with less than seven years of experience can earn
up to 25% of the team salary cap, players with seven to nine years of experience can earn up
to 30% of the team salary cap, and players who have more than ten years of experience can
earn up to 35% of the salary cap. The one exception to this rule is that players may earn
up to 105% of the last year of their previous contact. One should note that only the first
year of a contract is subject to these restrictions. Subsequent years may rise above these
thresholds, but only by the maximum raise allowed by the CBA (Coon, 2005a).4
The implementation of the individual player maximum salary arose from owners’ concerns
regarding the skyrocketing salaries of the leagues’ top players. Players, even those with
relatively little experience, were earning salaries far above what they had earned just a few
4The allowable maximum raise is dependent on the type of signing. The current CBA usually keeps this
number at 4.5% or 7.5% per year, but previous CBAs have allowed for higher raises.
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years ago, and the process seemed to show little sign of slowing (Staudohar, 1999). From the
owners’ perspective, the only way to stop these rising costs was to change the league’s policies.
As Table 2 shows, while the salaries of top players have increased, they have not increased
as quickly as the salary cap. Moreover, Table 2 shows that Michael Jordan’s contract during
the 1990s singlehandedly put his team over the salary cap, while the contracts of several
other players came close. Given that none of the contracts in Table 2 were signed after the
institution of the individual player salary cap, it appears clear that the change has been
effective in controlling player costs.
Table 2: Highest NBA Salaries (As Percentage of Team Salary Cap)
Player Year Salary Ratio to Cap
Michael Jordan 1997 $30,140,000 1.24
Michael Jordan 1998 $33,140,000 1.23
Earvin Johnson 1995 $14,660,000 0.92
Patrick Ewing 1996 $18,724,000 0.81
Patrick Ewing 1998 $20,500,000 0.76
Kevin Garnett 2004 $28,000,000 0.64
Shaquille O’Neal 2005 $27,696,430 0.63
Kevin Garnett 2003 $25,200,000 0.63
Patrick Ewing 1993 $18,500,000 0.62
Horace Grant 1997 $14,857,000 0.61
Shaquille O’Neal 2003 $23,571,429 0.59
Larry Bird 1992 $7,070,000 0.57
Shaquille O’Neal 2004 $24,749,999 0.56
Kevin Garnett 2001 $19,610,000 0.55
Shaquille O’Neal 2001 $19,285,715 0.54
In addition to the institution of individual player salary caps, the 1999 CBA also imple-
mented several other changes which are presented here for the sake of completeness. The
owners also benefitted from a change in the structure of rookie contracts, which gave teams
the option to extend the contract into a fourth year at a slight premium. Furthermore, the
league capped the amount that contracts may rise each year; for players who qualify for a
Larry Bird extension, the raise was capped at 12% and for all other players, the raise was
capped at 10%. As a small consolation, the league increased the minimum salary for players.
7
Additionally, the league added marijuana and several steroids to the illegal substance list
and increased the fines for players who test positive.
2.2 Free Agency
Another important factor in the NBA’s salary cap structure is free agency, which was
introduced in 1988 (Coon, 2012). This change allowed players to have more control over
where they played while also increasing their bargaining power. There are two types of free
agents: restricted free agents and unrestricted free agents. Historically, players have become
restricted free agents following their rookie contract and unrestricted free agents following
any subsequent contract. Unrestricted free agents are the more common and intuitive of the
two. They can sign with any team that they would like, so long as the agreement fits in the
league’s rules. For instance, these free agents can sign a less lucrative contract to play in a
more preferable location. Restricted free agents, on the other hand, lack the same degree
of freedom. They may only sign a contract if the team that currently owns their rights is
outbid (Coon, 2012). Unsurprisingly, restricted free agents tend to be underpaid relative to
unrestricted free agents (Krautmann et al., 2009).
2.3 Reverse Order Draft
Another important component of the NBA’s CBA is the reverse order lottery draft, which
was instituted in 1985 to promote balance within the league. Based upon their record, teams
are given a specific number of lottery balls. The team with the worst record gets the most
lottery balls, an amount that corresponds to a 25% chance of getting the first pick in the
draft. Similarly, the team with the second worst record gets the second most lottery balls.
This continues in a similar manner until all teams that missed the playoffs have some number
of lottery balls. The specifics are somewhat complicated, but essentially, the worse the record
of the team, the better their pick in the draft. While this still puts the onus on the team
to make the correct selection, high picks tend to represent better talent. Unfortunately, the
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reverse order draft creates a perverse incentive for teams, especially those who are unlikely to
make the playoffs, to lose. While losing this season may create undesirable outcomes in the
short term, the long run benefits of the top draft picks can be substantial. This phenomenon,
which is more commonly referred to as tanking, has been a problem in the league since the
institution of the reverse order draft and should be considered when examining a team’s
win-loss percentage.
3 Literature Review
Competition within sports is drastically different than competition in other industries.
Unlike most industries, competitors in sports (i.e. rival teams) must rely upon one another
to make a profit. The intuition behind this is simple: one of the main reasons that fans
enjoy watching sports is that any team can win.5 This desire for competition is formalized
by economists in the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH). In other words, if the talent
level between the teams is too uneven, spectators will not watch. Given the importance of
competitive balance within sports, it is unsurprising that a great deal of literature exists on
the subject.
3.1 Competitive Balance
The study of competitive balance began with Rottenberg (1956), who, in anticipation
of the Coase theorem,6 suggests that free agency would have no affect on the distribution
of talent, and therefore, the parity within a league. In the first formal model considering
competitive balance, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) find that competitive balance is directly
related to game attendance. That is, less competitive leagues have lower attendance. A clas-
sic example of this is the Cleveland Browns, who were so dominant in the late 1940’s that
5This phenomenon is best shown by the popularity of March Madness.
6The Coase theorem states that given a sufficiently low transaction cost the initial distribution of re-
sources does not impact the final outcome.
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their attendance was nearly cut in half (Quirk and Fort, 1992). More recent findings on the
benefits of competitive balance are divided. Peel and Thomas (1997) find that greater uncer-
tainty as measured by point spreads leads to higher attendances in British rugby matches.
Similarly, Forrest and Simmons (2002) find that attendance increases in the English Football
League when competing teams are more equally balanced. On the other hand, Coates and
Humphreys (2012) find evidence in the NHL that attendance increases when the home team
is a significant favorite. Lemke et al. (2010) find similar results when examining the 2007
MLB season.
In addition to the discussion about the importance of competitive balance, there is also
disagreement about how it should be measured. Much of the disagreement stems from
the fact that competitive balance is a broad term that can refer to the dispersion of wins
in a given season, dispersion of wins across seasons, the dispersion of championships, or
a variety of other measures. Obviously, different measures capture different imbalances
within a league. Historically, the most common measure of competitive balance has been
the standard deviation of winning percentage (e.g. Fort and Quirk 1995). Although the
measure is intuitive and simple to compute, it has several flaws. Depken (1999) introduces
an adjusted measure of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which he calls dHHI, to
measure concentration within a sports league. Depken’s new measure can be written as:
dHHI =
4
N2G2
N∑
i=1
[winsi]− 1
N
where N is the number of teams in a league, G is the number of games each team plays
in a season, and winsi is the number of wins for team i. He suggests that this measure is
superior to the dispersion of win percentage because it can be affected by exogenous variables.
Humphreys (2002) offers a measure called the Competitive Balance Ratio intended to more
accurately measure the parity of a league across seasons. While the traditional measure
can fail to account for relative changes between teams, Humphreys’ measure captures these
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differences. Schmidt (2001) adapts the Gini coefficient to measure competitive imbalances in
the MLB. While the measure may offer advantages in relating competitive balance to more
traditional measures of inequality, it offers little in the way of new insights.7
3.2 Competitive Balance within the NBA
The National Basketball Association has a variety of particular features that differentiates
it from other sports leagues. One of the more interesting of these particularities is the
lack of competitive balance in the NBA relative to other leagues. Indeed, Rockerbie (2014)
shows that the competitive imbalances in the NBA have significantly exceeded those of other
leagues since at least 1980. One explanation for this imbalance lies in one of the league’s
most notable features – the extraordinary height of its players. Berri et al. (2005) claims
that there is a relatively small number of individuals who are tall enough to fulfill certain
roles within the NBA and that these players are highly coveted. Because there are only
a handful of skilled tall players, the teams who possess these players will tend to have an
unfair advantage. Rockerbie (2014) acknowledges this as a possible explanation for some
of the National Basketball Association’s lack of parity, but instead places an emphasis on
the league’s abundance of scoring opportunities. More scoring opportunities would eliminate
much of the randomness involved in sporting events so that the team’s true skill level are more
accurately displayed. He runs a Monte Carlo simulation using NBA and NHL statistics and
determines that less scoring opportunities would result in a more competitive NBA. While
there is likely some truth in his findings, Rockerbie fails to account for the skill involved
in non-scoring interactions; these moments, which occur to varying degrees in both sports,
also have a significant impact on the outcome of sporting events. Schmidt and Berri (2003)
examine the effect that the opening of MLB’s labor market, first to those of other ethnicities
and later to those from foreign countries, has had on competitive balance within the league.
They find that an expanded labor supply results in improved competitive balance. The
7For a more detailed discussion of competitive balance see Zimbalist (2002) and Sanderson and Siegfried
(2003).
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theory behind these findings would also apply to the NBA, perhaps even more so given the
scarcity of extremely tall individuals.
One interesting ramification of the introduction of individual salary caps has been a
redistribution of income amongst NBA players. Obviously, if star players are earning less
than their fair market wage and teams are required to maintain their spending above a salary
floor, overall spending on salaries is unlikely to decrease significantly, just be reallocated.
Hastings and Stephenson (2015) shows that not only is this true, but that the players most
likely to benefit are the players who are just below the stars in terms of talent. Furthermore,
Hastings and Stephenson find that the 1999 CBA reduced player’s early career earnings,
primarily through changes to rookie contracts.
Another interesting feature that is rather peculiar to the NBA is the impact of superstars.
While great players have a disproportionate effect on the result of games in all sports, this
effect is magnified for superstars in the NBA. This is likely the result of the fact that NBA
teams start only 5 players, the least amongst all major North American sport leagues, as
well as the fact that starters in the NBA tend to play a higher portion of minutes than
their counterparts in the NBA, NFL, and NHL. Therefore, it should come as no surprise
that these superstars are also important in generating revenue.8 As such, superstars tend
to earn significantly higher salaries than their teammates. Perhaps surprisingly, Simmons
and Berri (2011) find that income disparities, when driven by differences in player talent,
actually improves the overall performance of the team. One explanation is that these salary
differences reinforce important team hierarchies. They find that these effects disappear when
the income disparities are not justified.
3.3 Salary Caps and Competitive Balance
One of the major tools that sports leagues use to improve competitive balance is the im-
plementation of a team level salary cap. Fort and Quirk (1995) are the first to consider the
8Interestingly, Berri and Schmidt (2006) found that superstars tend to increase revenue for road games,
implying that the “superstar externality” predominately benefits the other teams in the NBA.
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effects of team level salary caps on competitive balance. They suggest that because teams
in larger cities tend to draw more fans than smaller cities, they have a higher marginal
revenue curve and, therefore, will spend more than their smaller counterparts. However, if
large market teams are unable to spend more, then competitive imbalances should be less
likely to develop. Thus, salary caps at the team level should improve competitive balance.
Surprisingly though, when Fort and Quirk examined the NBA in the years following the im-
plementation of the salary cap in 1984, they found that competitive balance did not improve.
One possible suggestion for this surprise is that the flexibility of the NBA’s soft cap and the
difficulty of enforcing the salary cap proved inadequate in removing spending imbalances.
Another possibility is that improvements might require several years to take effect; this is
particularly likely given the exemption granted to several of the highest-spending teams in
the NBA prior to the establishment of the salary cap.
Vrooman (1995) adopts a more cynical view by focusing more closely on the cost effects
of implementing a salary cap. By definition, a salary cap limits the total amount that is
spent on player salaries. This can result in a reduction in costs, particularly considering that
players are the most significant expenditure for sports teams. Given this incentive, instead of
having any objective to improve competitive balance, the salary cap could be an attempt at
collusion by the NBA. Vrooman also disagrees with the economic theory put forward by Fort
and Quirk that salary caps improve competitive balance. Instead, he argues, competitive
balance will be reduced as a salary cap magnifies the inherent advantages of being located
in a larger city.
Kesenne (2000) expands upon the earlier theoretical framework established by Fort and
Quirk (1995) by adjusting for differences in player talent; in his simple model, there are two
types of players: stars and regular players. Kesenne, however, does not include any form
of a salary floor in his model; he considers a league without minimum salaries or revenue
sharing. Despite the difference in assumptions, Kesenne comes to the same conclusion as
Fort and Quirk, that team level salary caps improve competitive balance. Furthermore,
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Kesenne concludes that the profits of all teams in the league will improve, a result that
differs from Fort and Quirk largely due to their consideration of revenue sharing. The cost
of this improvement is a reduction of total league revenues as players leave for markets
that are unable to fully monetize their skills. Therefore the increase in equity results in a
movement away from the Pareto optimal point.
Kesenne also briefly discusses the issue of individual player salary caps, which were im-
plemented in the NBA for the first time following the 1998-1999 lockout. He argues that
individual player salary caps actually reduce competitive balance. By limiting the amount
that teams can offer star players, the benefits of a large market like endorsements and lifestyle
opportunities are magnified. Therefore, the larger teams will be more likely to acquire players
who earn salaries near the individual limit. The cap also serves to reduce inequality among
teammates, for better or worse. Sanderson and Siegfried (2003) second this conjecture. They
suggest that individual player salary caps will decrease competitive balance by incentivizing
top players to sign with winning teams because there is unlikely to be a difference in the
salary.
Giocoli (2007), unlike many of the previous papers in the field, allows for owners to have
different goals. Most of the literature prior to his work has assumed that teams are either all
profit-maximizing or all win-maximizing. However, in reality, some teams maximize profits
and others maximize wins. More specifically, larger teams often chase wins while owners of
smaller teams are unable to compete and instead maximize profits. Famous examples of this
win-maximizing behavior include former Yankees owner George Steinbrenner and current
Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban, who were both willing to spend millions of dollars to
acquire and keep superstar players. Giocoli updates the seminal model from Fort and Quirk
(1995) to account for this change in assumptions. When this restriction is relaxed, he finds
that competitive balance is reduced relative to the situation where all owners were profit
maximizing. In other words, the larger, win-maximizing teams do just that: win. However,
salary caps – both in the form of a general cap or a team-specific cap – can help remedy
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this issue. A league-wide salary cap would likely only impact high spending teams, thereby
reducing the amount of talent that they can acquire. Team-specific caps would work in a
similar way, but are likely easier to introduce because they are independent of the large
variation in team revenues.
Larsen et al. (2006) examine the affect of free agency and the salary cap on competitive
balance in the National Football League. Because both free agency and the salary cap were
implemented as a result of changes to the CBA following the 1993 season, it is difficult to
disentangle the two. Nevertheless, they use a regression model in an attempt to estimate
the combined effect. Looking at the period 1970-2002, they find that the introduction of
these institutions has improved competitive balance, which is consistent with the theoretical
framework exposed by Fort and Quirk and later Kesenne.
Overall, their model is similar to the one used in Fort and Quirk (1995), except for two
major differences. First, they add independent variables that measure new stadiums, team
relocation, season length, playoff spots, strikes, and player talent. While several of these such
as season length and playoff spots are intuitive, it is not immediately clear why all of these
variables are important. The motivation behind having a variable for new stadiums is that
an energized crowd may provide a team with a superior home field advantage. Interestingly,
Larsen, Fenn, and Spenner find that the construction of new stadiums has actually improved
competitive balance within the NFL. Player talent, measured by points a team scored and
allowed, is meant to account for the dispersion of talent within the league; unsurprisingly,
this measure is significant and positively related to competitive balance. Strikes are included
because they often result in shortened season and in one case, the strikes even resulted in
the acquisition and use of substitute players. The second difference from Fort and Quirk’s
model is that when they calculate competitive balance, they use two separate measures –
Gini coefficients and dHHI – instead of the standard deviation of winning percentage. The
conclusions of the model are robust to both measures.
Maxcy and Mondello (2006) examines free agency in the NFL, NBA, and NHL. They use
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the standard deviation of win percentage as well as Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
as their measure of competitive balance. They determine that while free agency improved
competitive balance in both the NFL and NHL, free agency actually had a negative impact
on competitive balance in the NBA. Maxcy and Mondello conclude that the effects of free
agency on competitive balance are not independent. Instead, the outcome is the influenced
by the league’s bargaining agreement. In addition, Maxcy and Mondello determine that the
NBA’s implementation of a team salary cap as well as both a team and player salary cap
reduced competitive balance. Their model, however, only considers a few years after the
implementation of the 1999 CBA. Similar to the discussion regarding Fort and Quirk (1995),
many of these changes may require more than a few years to fully take effect. Additionally,
Maxcy and Mondello fail to account for several important variables such as the expanding
pool of international players. My analysis will more accurately determine the long-term
effects of the new collective bargaining agreement.
4 Data
The models in this paper use three types of data: statistics that the National Basketball
Association collects about productivity at the team level, data detailing the country of origin
for each individual player, and salary information for every player in a given year. Table
3 shows the summary statistics for the most important variables used in my analysis; a
description of these variables can be found in Section 5. The mean for the standard deviation
of win percentage (SDWP) is 0.16, meaning that in an average season in this time frame,
68% of the teams would have winning percentages between 0.34 and 0.66. The variable
FOREIGN has a mean of 0.14, indicating that, on average, 14% of the players in the sample
did not originate from the United States.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
SDWP 0.16 0.015 0.13 0.19
dHHI 0.0034 0.00066 0.0023 0.0049
1999CBA 0.68 0.48 0 1
LOCKOUT1 0.04 0.2 0 1
LOCKOUT2 0.04 0.2 0 1
EXPANSION 0.08 0.28 0 1
TEAMS 29.04 1.14 27 30
TALENT 0.07 0.003 0.067 0.74
FOREIGN 0.14 0.066 0.052 0.226
4.1 Team Data
All of the productivity data at the team level is from Basketball Reference (http://www.
basketball-reference.com). It includes a variety of statistics such as wins, losses, points,
and assists. Using this data, I am able to construct many of the measures of competitive
balance that I previously discussed. I focus on two measures: standard deviation of win
percentage and dHHI. I chose the standard deviation of win percentage because it is intuitive
and has historically been the most widely chosen measure, making it a good baseline. I have
also decided to use dHHI because it is generally viewed as a more accurate measure of
competitive balance. Figures 1 and 2 show these two measures over time. The graphs
clearly show that the NBA was more competitively balanced during the early 2000s though
the league grew less balanced towards the end of that decade. It is not obvious from the
graph whether the 1999 CBA had any effect on competitive balance. What is clear is that
the graphs depicting the standard deviation of win percentage and dHHI are quite similar.
This makes sense because the two measures are related mathematically; however, even with
this relationship, there are a few important differences between the two measures.
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4.2 Player Data
Information regarding the country of origin for NBA players, which is obtained from
RealGM (http://basketball.realgm.com/nba/players), is displayed below in Figure 3.
It is clear that the number of foreign players has increased dramatically since the turn of the
century, rising from about 8% to over 22% of total players. This increase in foreign players
should represent a growing supply of labor and therefore, a more balanced league.
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Figure 3: Percentage of Foreign Players in NBA
4.3 Salary Data
All of the data regarding player salary comes from Bender (n.d.). This data contains
salary information at both the team and player level as well as information about the salary
cap for each year. As Figure 4 shows, the average salary of an NBA player has increased
dramatically over the past several decades. The drop and later stagnation in wages beginning
in the mid 2000s is the result of an increase in the total number of players in the NBA. That
is, while the overall amount that the players earn continues to rise, it must be shared amongst
a growing number of players. Figure 5 displays the real salary of players over time; it shows
a similar, though less dramatic rise in the average salary. The increase in player salaries is
mirrored by the increase in the salary cap, which is shown in Figure 6.
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5 Model
The model is similar to the methodology used in Larsen et al. (2006) as well as Maxcy
and Mondello (2006). I use the equations:
SDWP = β0 + β1TEAMS + β2TALENT + β3FOREIGN + β41999CBA
+ β5LOCKOUT1 + β6LOCKOUT2 + β7EXPANSION +  (1)
dHHI = γ0 + γ1TEAMS + γ2TALENT + γ3FOREIGN + γ41999CBA
+ γ5LOCKOUT1 + γ6LOCKOUT2 + γ7EXPANSION +  (2)
Where:
SDWP The standard deviation of the winning percentages in a given year.
dHHI A measure of competitive balance as first suggested in Depken (1999).
TEAMS The number of teams in the league in a given season.
TALENT A measure of player talent, similar to that in Larsen et al. (2006).
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FOREIGN The percentage of players in the NBA who are not from the United States.9
1999CBA A dummy variable for seasons after the 1999 CBA was implemented.
LOCKOUT1 1 if the season was 1999, 0 otherwise.
LOCKOUT2 1 if the season was 2012, 0 otherwise.
EXPANSION 1 if the season involved an expansion, 0 otherwise.10
The measure of talent is designed to account not only for player talent, but also coaching
talent, training staff, and a host of other measures. The measure is defined as
Talent = HHIPF +HHIPA
where the measure of offensive talent, HHIPFt is defined as:
HHIPFt =
N∑
i=1
[
Points Scoredi
Total Points Scored in the League
]2
and the measure of defensive talent, HHIPAt is defined as:
HHIPFt =
N∑
i=1
[
Points Allowedi
Total Points Allowed in the League
]2
The two measures are then summed to form an overall measure of talent because offensive
and defensive talent interact with one other. For example, a player may steal the ball on
defense, which typically leads to an easy score on offense. Similarly, if a team is able to
score during their offensive possession, they will have more time to set up their defense and
therefore, will likely allow fewer points.
I have added the measure of foreign players in the NBA based upon the findings of
Schmidt and Berri (2003). As Figure 3 shows, the percentage of foreign born players rose
9Players who are from the United States as well as another country are not considered to be from the
United States. Also, it is worth noting that this data is based upon a player’s formative years, not where
they played college basketball.
10The NBA expanded from 27 teams to 29 teams in the 1995-96 season and added its 30th and final team
in the 2004-05 season.
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substantially around the turn of the century. Therefore, if this effect does exist, it would
have a sizable impact on competitive balance in the NBA.
I would expect the variable measuring the effects of the 1999 CBA to be negative as
suggested by Kesenne (2000) as well as the observations by Maxcy and Mondello (2006). The
variable measuring the percentage of foreign players in the NBA, FOREIGN, is expected to
be negative as it should signify a growing supply of players. The measure of talent, TALENT,
is expected to be positive because a concentration of talent on a given team would exacerbate
competitive balance issues.
6 Results
The results from the models described in the previous section are listed below in Table 4.
The signs of the coefficients are the same across all models suggesting that the results do not
vary based upon the measure of competitive balance selected. The coefficient for the variable
of interest, the 1999 collective bargaining agreement, is significant and negative, indicating
that the changes improved competitive balance. However, the robustness checks in Section
7 suggest that attributing this effect to the 1999 CBA is misleading. Instead, it appears that
the changes brought about by the 1999 CBA had no effect on competitive balance. This
result contradicts both the theoretical findings by Kesenne (2000) as well as the observations
by Maxcy and Mondello (2006). Part of the difference between my findings and Kesenne
(2000) could be explained by the specific interactions between the individual player salary
cap and the other specifications in the NBA’s CBA as well as the fact that the 1999 CBA
brought additional changes beyond just the addition of the individual player salary cap.
Similarly, Maxcy and Mondello only consider a few years following the implementation of
the new CBA. Competitive imbalances might have arose in the short term as some teams
were able to adapt more quickly to the new rules due to better management or more flexible
balance sheets. Furthermore, the rule changes would have no effect on existing contracts,
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Table 4: Regression Results
Dependent variable:
dHHI SDWP dHHI
(1) (2) (3)
TEAMS 0.010∗∗ 0.093 0.003
(0.004) (0.120) (0.005)
TALENT 3.936∗∗ 31.176 1.103
(1.735) (47.188) (1.918)
FOREIGN −0.015∗∗∗ −0.146 −0.006
(0.004) (0.144) (0.006)
1999CBA −0.031∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.012) (0.001)
LOCKOUT1 0.005 0.0002
(0.014) (0.001)
LOCKOUT2 −0.002 −0.0001
(0.012) (0.0005)
EXPANSION −0.010 −0.0005
(0.009) (0.0004)
Constant −0.565∗∗ −4.651 −0.167
(0.249) (6.742) (0.274)
Observations 25 25 25
R2 0.447 0.568 0.648
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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meaning that many players would be unaffected by this change until their contract expired,
which may have taken several years to occur.
The model also suggests that as the number of teams in the league increase, so do
competitive imbalances, though this result is only significant in the base model. Intuitively,
this makes sense because, particularly in a star driven league like the NBA, more teams just
means more teams without a superstar. Moreover, if, as suggested in Berri et al. (2005),
the lack of parity in the NBA is caused by a short supply of tall people, then stretching this
supply further would only exacerbate competitive balance problems.
The measure of concentration of talent in the league is positive, as expected, though
once again, the result is only significant in the base model. Such a result is consistent with
Larsen et al.’s finding of competitive balance in the NFL. Naturally, when a handful of
teams are more talented than the rest of the league, these teams are more likely to win,
indicating competitive balance issues. Interestingly, as Schmidt and Berri (2003) suggests,
the coefficient of the percentage of foreign players is negative. In other words, as the league
has become more global, it has also become more balanced.
Though the model suggests that the changes involved in the 1999 CBA did not have
a significant impact on competitive balance within the NBA, the exact reasons why this
result differs from the model suggested in Kesenne (2000) is unclear. It is possible that the
institution of the cap on individual player salaries did reduce competitive balance within
the NBA, but this effect was balanced out by other rule changes in the 1999 CBA. While
the players’ share of revenue has varied since the 1999 season, one would expect this change
to have little affect on competitive balance. Likewise, the increase in the minimum salary
and changes to the drug testing policy are of little consequence with regard to competitive
balance. The 1999 CBA gave teams the option to retain their rookie players for an additional
year; this change would appear to have a positive effect on competitive balance, though the
change involved is likely to be minimal because it only affects relatively inexperienced players
and even these players are only affected for a single season (Coon, 2005a). Therefore, while
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it is possible that other changes in the 1999 CBA may have counteracted the effects that
individual player salary caps have had on competitive balance, it is rather unlikely.
A more likely explanation is that the specific structure of the NBA’s collective bargaining
agreement offers an advantage to incumbent teams that neutralizes the competitive balance
effects suggested by Kesenne. First, incumbent teams can typically offer their players a
higher year-to-year raise. Since only the first year of a contract is subject to the maximum
salary cap, players can actually earn more in the subsequent years of a multi-year contract.
Therefore, incumbent teams, can usually offer a slightly higher salary than other teams.
Similarly, in some cases, incumbent teams have the ability to use the Larry Bird Exception
to exceed the team level salary cap. This additional financial flexibility allows incumbent
teams to offer more lucrative contracts than other teams in the same circumstances. Second,
incumbent teams offer a sense of continuity in both the player’s professional and personal life.
Because teams who have a greater sense of continuity tend to have better team chemistry,
they are more likely to win, which can translate into a more lucrative contract or endorsement
deal. Similarly, changing teams usually means uprooting one’s family. This can be difficult
for those who have become accustomed to life in a particular community. Another possible
explanation is that the rising salaries of the second and third most talented players on a
roster counteracted any reduction in cost of the league’s best players. Along this line of
thinking, it is also possible that the reduction in salaries disparity disrupted some team
hierarchies. Thus, while it may be easier to assemble a roster with a superstar or two, it is
harder to surround those players with the necessary talent to win.
Furthermore, the cap is not binding for all players. For instance, players can occasionally
prioritize other factors above money. Veteran players, in particular, are often willing to
take below market offers to improve their chances of winning though this trend would likely
be limited to players who have earned a significant amount over the course of their career.
Younger players would certainly be less likely to engage in similar behavior. Additionally,
the so called grandfather clause, which allows players to exceed the individual player cap as
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long as the salary is 105% or less of their previous year’s salary, reduces the true effect of
rule changes. While most of the players in the NBA were signed before the rule was put into
effect, some were not. In particular there are a number of superstars who have spent the
majority of their career free of the restriction. Kobe Bryant, for instance, earned $30,453,805
during the 2013-2014 season despite the fact that without the grandfather clause, players
with his experience would only be able to earn $20,644,400.
One drawback of the analysis is that it does not account for changes in play style. A
number of rule changes instituted by the league have altered both the offensive and defensive
landscape of the NBA. The NBA, once driven by isolation plays, is now more dependent
on ball movement and teamwork. Moreover, the three point shot has become increasingly
important in the modern NBA. Figure 7 shows how the three pointer has grown in popularity
over the past two decades.11 If, as suggested by Berri et al. (2005), tall players are the cause
of the NBA’s lack of parity, then the transition toward rules that are more favorable to
shorter players would improve parity.
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Figure 7: 3−Pointers as a Percentage of Total Field Goals
Beyond the concerns about competitive balance, there are also concerns about the equity
11The sudden rise in the graph during the mid-90’s is caused by the decision of the NBA to shorten the
three-point line. The graph falls back to trend levels when the NBA restored the three-point line to its
original dimensions.
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of the current situation. By definition, the individual player cap prevents some players
from being paid their fair market value. In that respect, the situation is highly bizarre. It
is difficult to imagine a situation in which a similar cap would be imposed on lawyers or
musicians, for instance. But in the world of sports, such a restriction is accepted. Experts
suggest that some of the NBA’s best players would earn more than double their current salary
if the league repealed the individual salary cap (Lowe, 2014). Is it fair that these players
take a pay cut so that other players, more specifically the next tier of players, according
to Hastings and Stephenson (2015), may make money? The question is not just limited to
fairness. If players’ concerns about equity influences their play, it could have consequences
for the NBA’s overall product quality.
The policy recommendations for the NBA with regards to individual player caps appear
clear. The NBA enjoys the lower costs that are associated with individual maximum salary
caps without having to suffer any reduction in competitive balance. As such, the league
should keep individual salary caps in place. The policy recommendations for the overall
salary cap, however, are less clear. One move that the league could make is to employ
a stricter salary cap. This would have the dual benefit of reducing costs and improving
competitive balance. However, it seems unlikely that owners would pass such a bill because
owners that spend over the cap are, at least to some extent, win-maximizing and are less
interested in reducing their costs than increasing their wins. Meanwhile, owners who are
profit-maximizing benefit from other owners going over the cap, as they may be entitled to a
share of the excess spending, particularly because spending more money does not necessarily
lead to more wins (Coon, 2012). In fact, the 2005-2006 New York Knicks, who have the
highest team salary in NBA history, actually had a losing record. It may just be that the
only contracts that really matter are those of superstars.
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7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Dummy Variable
One important robustness check is to ensure that the results vary if I chose a different
starting year for the CBA dummy variable. To do this, I run a similar regression but replace
the 1999 CBA dummy variable with a dummy variable beginning in 2000 or 2001 instead.
The results, which are shown below in Table 5, remain negative and significant. This suggests
that the reduction in competitive balance did not stem from the 1999 CBA.
7.2 Time Window
Another robustness check that I can perform is to vary the window of time that I consider.
It is possible that a smaller window might more accurately capture the changes enacted
by the CBA. This is particularly true when one considers that the number of complicating
factors, whether in the form of rule changes or changes to the collective bargaining agreement,
increases as the time period lengthens. Table 6 shows the results when I only consider a
five-year window before and after the implementation of the 1999 CBA and Table 7 shows
the results for a three-year window. Both tables reinforce the results in Section 7.1 that the
1999 CBA had no effect on competitive balance.
7.3 Conferences
As Figure 8 below shows, the two conferences of the NBA do not have the same level of
competitive balance. Historically, the Western Conference has had more imbalances between
its teams than the Eastern Conference. Given the imbalance between conferences, it is
natural to wonder if the 1999 CBA might have had an effect on the respective conferences.
To test this, I run the earlier regression for each conference, the results once again suggest
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that the 1999 CBA had no effect on competitive balance for either conference.12
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8 Conclusion
The decision of the NBA to limit player salaries as part of the 1999 collective bargaining
agreement was most certainly done in light of skyrocketing costs. The decision, however,
had the potential to cause serious ramifications across the league, particularly with respect
to the level of competitive balance. My analysis suggests that, contrary to earlier studies,
the changes associated with the 1999 collective bargaining agreement did not have any im-
pact on competitive balance within the NBA. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the
globalization of the NBA has improved the league’s competitive balance.
Future studies may wish to vary the measure of competitive balance that is used. While it
appears that measures involving winning percentage do not support the idea that competitive
balance has changed with the implementation of the 1999 CBA, measures that address
the dispersion of championships, which may be more important to some NBA fans, might
generate different results. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if the results vary when
12Although Table 8 suggests that the 1999 CBA may have had a slight affect on competitive balance
within the Eastern Conference, repeating the methods used in Section 7.1 show that this is not the case.
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looking at the NHL, the other professional North American sports league that has limits on
individual player salaries. Though it would be natural for the results to be similar across
leagues, it is also clear that the results of such measures are dependent upon the entirety of
a collective bargaining agreement.
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9 Appendix
Table 5: Robustness Check
Dependent variable:
dHHI
(1) (2)
TEAMS 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
TALENT 1.103 1.859
(1.918) (2.110)
FOREIGN −0.006 −0.005
(0.006) (0.008)
Robust2000 −0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Robust2001 −0.001∗
(0.001)
LOCKOUT1 −0.001∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
LOCKOUT2 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0005) (0.001)
EXPANSION −0.0005 −0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Constant −0.167 −0.271
(0.274) (0.302)
Observations 25 25
R2 0.648 0.577
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
36
Table 6: Five-Year Window
Dependent variable:
SDWP dHHI
(1) (2)
TEAMS 0.357 0.015
(0.529) (0.021)
TALENT 133.758 5.773
(206.466) (8.024)
FOREIGN −0.347 −0.014∗
(0.152) (0.006)
1999CBA −0.020 −0.001
(0.014) (0.001)
LOCKOUT1 −0.005 −0.0002
(0.013) (0.001)
EXPANSION −0.017 −0.001
(0.009) (0.0004)
Constant −19.396 −0.838
(29.606) (1.151)
Observations 10 10
R2 0.954 0.964
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: Three-Year Window
Dependent variable:
SDWP dHHI
(1) (2)
TALENT 64.418 3.209
(469.864) (18.417)
FOREIGN −0.578 −0.023
(0.408) (0.016)
1999CBA −0.016 −0.001
(0.020) (0.001)
LOCKOUT1 −0.005 −0.0002
(0.021) (0.001)
Constant −4.221 −0.215
(32.482) (1.273)
Observations 6 6
R2 0.958 0.967
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Competitive Balance by Conferences
Dependent variable:
SDWPEast SDWPWest
(1) (2)
1999CBA −0.050∗ 0.016
(0.025) (0.020)
LOCKOUT1 −0.042∗ 0.013
(0.024) (0.019)
LOCKOUT2 0.030 −0.031∗
(0.020) (0.018)
EXPANSION 0.006 −0.006
(0.016) (0.014)
TEAMSEAST 0.040
(0.082)
TALENTEAST 2.688
(7.481)
TEAMSWEST 0.162∗∗∗
(0.055)
TALENTWEST 14.894∗∗
(5.673)
FOREIGN 0.207∗ −0.296∗
(0.117) (0.147)
Constant −0.810 −4.193∗∗
(2.212) (1.574)
Observations 25 25
R2 0.384 0.652
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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